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ARGUMENT
POINT ONE:

UTAH STATUTES AND COMMON LAW PROVIDE MULTIPLE

MEANS OF RECOVERY AGAINST PROVIDERS OF ALCOHOL.

THE DRAMSHOP ACT

IS NOT AN EXCLUSIVE REMEDY.
Counts two and three of Plaintiff's Complaint (R. 6) allege
causes of action for negligent sale of alcohol to an intoxicated
or interdicted person by Defendants and willful and wanton
conduct of Defendants.

These two causes of action are based upon

negligence and willful misconduct in violation of statute.

The

lower Court dismissed those causes of action and ruled that the
Dramshop Act was Plaintiff's exclusive remedy.
Plaintiff's position is that the Court erred as a matter of
law in making that ruling and that in fact, Plaintiff's have a
common law cause of action and a cause of action for statutory
violation against the liquor providers.

This is the subject of

Point 3 of Plaintiff's opening brief.
seeking to justify the ruling of the Court,
arg
Act

y and ask this Court to rule that the Dramshop
other common law and statutory remedies.
i to it's defense of the Court Order ruling that

the Dramshop Act pre-emted all other causes of action, Defendants
purport to provide a history of liability in Utah for furnishing
alcohol to another.

In so doing, the cases of Yost

P.2d 1044 (Utah 1981) and Rees v. Albertson's,

Inc.

v. State

640

587 P.2d 130

(Utah 1978) are cited.
In Footnote No. 8, Defendants state that neither Rees nor
Yost

are traditional "Dramshop" cases.
1

They claim that in each

case, the injured Plaintiffs were minors who had purchased
alcohol directly from the Defendants.
That statement is not true.

In -Rees, the action sought

contribution for fifty four thousand, seven hundred forty two and
50/100 dollars ($54,742.50), which had been paid on the part of
Rees in satisfaction of claims against him.

The summary judgment

in favor of Albertson's was reversed and remanded by this Court.
It will be noted that this appears to be an insurance subrogation
and not a suit against Albertson's, Inc. for injuries to Rees.
The plain implication of that case is that Dramshop liability
existed in this state before the passage of the Dramshop Act and
that there was third party causes of action.
In Yost,

the statement of facts shows that all of the

alcohol was purchased by one Hammond (age 18), a friend of

Yost.

Here again, this Court has approved an action against a liquor
provider to third persons who injured the claimant.

A careful

reading of that case will show that the action is by the person
to whom the liquor was sold.

This shows conclusively that there

was common law Dramshop Liability in this state before the
adoption of the first Dramshop Act in 1981.

Defendants then claim that the Dramshop Act pre-empted all
coitoaon law causes of action and bases the assertion on
v. AT&T Communications

Retherford

844 P.2d 949 (Utah 1992).

We again point out that Plaintiffs suit embraces several
causes of action.

One of which relates to the negligent sale of
2

alcohol to Paul Bredehoft, which is a common law claim and the
violation of the Alcohol Beverage Control Act.
Retherford

The issue in

was whether the employees' common law claims were pre-

empted by the Utah Anti Discrimination Act or by the Federal Taft
Hardley Act.

The statute of limitations had run on a number of

the claims that could have been brought under those two acts.
However, there were other claims not embraced within the two acts
and Plaintiff was permitted to proceed to trial on those claims.
Retherford

dealt only with statutory pre-emption regarding

common law claims.

Plaintiff's causes of action assert claims

under both the Dramshop Act, common law negligence and violation
of the Alcohol Beverage Control Act.

Both statutes were adopted

at the same legislative session (in 1985).

There is nothing in

either act which states that it is an exclusive remedy, (cf Title
34A-5-107(15), which specifically states that the procedures
contained in that section are the exclusive remedy under state
law for employment discrimination). The two liquor sections of
the law stand on equal footing.

How can it be said that one

statute pre-empts the other, or that either pre-empt common law
causes of action?
The 1997 Legislature amended the Dramshop Act (32A-14-101).
Each house of the Legislature adopted virtually identical "intent
language" for the amendments.

The Senate Journal contains the

following:
INTENT LANGUAGE FOR SUB. S.B. 112
On Motion of Senator Buhler, the following intent
language is printed in the Senate Journal. Senator Mayne
commented.
3

The express inclusion of wrongful death to Section 32A14-101 does not create a new right but merely clarifies that
a person has the right to recover both special and several
(sic general) damages for wrongful death under the Dramshop
Act.
The bill does not modify any common law right that
exists for injuries or wrongful death resulting from giving,
selling, or otherwise providing alcoholic beverages.

The House Journal states the intent language as follows:
INTENT LANGUAGE ON Sub S.b. 112
In passing 1st Substitute Senate Bill 112, Dramshop
Liability Amendments, the Legislature intends the following:
The express inclusion of wrongful death to Section 31A14-101 does not create a new right but merely clarifies that
a person has the right to recover both special and general
damages for wrongful death under the Dramshop Act.
The bill does not modify any common law right that
exists for injuries or wrongful death resulting from giving,
selling, or otherwise providing alcoholic beverages.
When the Defendants asked this Court to adopt their
reasoning that the "Dramshop Act pre-empts all other common law
and statutory claims of civil liability for furnishing alcohol to
another", they may not have been aware that the Legislature of
the State of Utah does not agree.
This Court must reverse the lower Court Order dismissing
Plaintiffs' statutory and common law claims.

4

POINT TWO:

THE DRAMSHOP DAMAGE CAP IS NOT CONSTITUTIONAL.

Under this point, Defendant argues only that Article XVI, §
5 of the Utah Constitution has no application to this case.
support, it cites cases, such as Tiede

v. State

(Utah 1996) and McCorvey

of Transportation

41 (Utah 1993).

Department

915 P.2d 500
868 P.2d

Those cases deal only with the concept of

"Governmental Immunity".
it's consent.

v.

In

The state can be sued only if it gives

If the state does consent, then it may impose

conditions on that consent including a damage limitation.
case of Condemarin

v.

University

Hospital

In the

775 P.2d 348 (Utah

1989), cited but not discussed by Defendant, the Court determined
that the University Hospital was acting in a proprietary capacity
and therefore, the damage cap was constitutionally flawed under a
due process and uniform operation of the laws analysis.
Condemarin

has controlling importance in this case.

In Plaintiff's opening brief, numerous provisions of the
Utah Constitution are cited, each of which or in combination,
show that the damage cap is unconstitutional.
Defendants dismiss all of Plaintiff's arguments in that
regard by stating that Plaintiffs never raised these
constitutional issues in the trial court and hence they cannot be
asserted on appeal.
least.

The statement is astonishing to say the

The attention of the Court is invited to a Memorandum

filed by Plaintiffs on June 27, 1996, following the entry of the
verdict in this case (R. 1288).

The Court will see immediately

that Plaintiffs cite Article XVI, § 5 of the Utah Constitution as
well as Article I, § 24 (Uniform Operation of Laws) and Article
5

I, § 11 (Open Courts of the Utah Constitution). Even further, in
a Memorandum filed on August 5, 1996, in response to the brief of
Amicus (R. 1425), Plaintiffs stated at Pg. 1427:
In a footnote to "Amicus" Point II it is stated that
there are no constitutional issues in this case because a
common law action against a liquor provider did not exist.
The premise for the conclusion is erroneous and even
further, there are several constitutional provisions that
bear on this case regardless of whether a common law action
against a liquor provider existed. So that there will be no
doubt in anyone's mind, the damage cap in the Dramshop Act
violates the following provisions of the Utah Constitution:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Article
Article
Article
Article
Article

I, §
I, §
I, §
I, §
XVI,

7 (Due Process of Law)
10 (Trial by Jury)
11 (Open Courts)
24 (Uniform Operation of Law)
§ 5 (Wrongful Death - Damages)

Cases already before this Court, such as Condemarin v.
University
Hospital
775 P.2d 348 (Utah 1989), point to the
conclusion that when the rights of a class of citizens are
taken away by the Legislature, such as the damage cap in
this case, the Legislation cannot pass the heightened
scrutiny test imposed by the Utah Constitution. Even before
that point is reached, the damage cap must fail under
Article XVI, § 5 where the Legislature is prohibited from
abrogating the Wrongful Death Statute or limiting the amount
of damage thereunder.
Although the lower Court disagreed with Plaintiffs' position
regarding the constitutional issues, it clearly knew that they
had been briefed and argued.

In it's Memorandum decision (R.

1521), after discussing Article XVI, § 5 of the Utah
Constitution, the Court states at Page 1524, the following:
The Court does not find that the other constitutional
provisions relied upon by the Plaintiffs could allow this
Court to declare the damage cap unconstitutional.
Accordingly, this Court is required to grant Defendant
private clubs' motion to enter the Judgment against them in
accordance with the damage limitation imposed by legislative
mandate.

6

There can be no question that all of the constitutional
issues raised by Plaintiff on this appeal, were cited and argued
before the lower Court.

7

POINT THREE:

PLAINTIFFS DO HAVE STANDING TO SUE THE DEFENDANT

LIQUOR PROVIDERS FOR THE WRONGFUL DEATH OF THEIR SON, SEAN
ADKINS.
Defendants claim under this point that Plaintiffs lack
standing to sue and as support for that proposition, they adopt
points I, II, and III of the brief filed by Amicus.
Defendants raise this issue for the first time on appeal.
It is true that this issue first surfaced in the lower Court in a
memorandum filed, not by Defendants, but by Amicus after the case
had been tried.

In its brief, in an argument before the Court,

it suggested to the Court that the Utah Dramshop Act did not
allow a suit for wrongful death, and therefore the case should be
dismissed.
The lower Court dealt summarily with that assertion and
ruled that the Utah Dramshop Act did embrace a cause of action
for wrongful death and that if the Legislature intended that
result, it did not so state.

The lower Court stated:

While the courts must follow the clear mandates of
legislative statutes, the language relating to the types of
injuries and damages that may be sued upon under the
Dramshop Act is less than a model of clarity. A fair
reading of the statute does not suggest to this Court that
the Legislature intended to allow recovery for injuries and
damages as a result of a violation of the Dramshop Act for
any injury or loss, as long as it does not result in death,
the greatest loss. Where a legislative statute and its
scope are not clear or is ambiguous, this Court should not
impose an interpretation upon that legislative statute that
causes an unreasonable result. There is no logical reason,
either in this record or in the Court's mind that could
justify a conclusion that the Legislature in creating a
statutory right of action against a liquor provider as
contained in the Dramshop Act, intended to exclude a cause
of action to persons who had suffered a loss because of the
death of a child, such as the plaintiffs here. If the
Legislature was intent on carving out an exception to

8

persons who have a cause of action under the Dramshop Act so
as to exclude death claims, it could have easily said so,
and it did not. This Court declines to read such an
illogical statement to the unclear language of the statute.
(R. 1527-1528)
Amicus requested and was granted leave to file a brief by
this Court.

The three points contained in the current brief and

relied upon by Defendants are similar to those asserted below.
They are:

A.

POINT ONE:

THE WRONGFUL DEATH ACT DOES NOT APPLY TO THE
UTAH DRAMSHOP ACT.

POINT TWO:

PLAINTIFFS MAY NOT RECOVER UNDER THE DRAMSHOP
ACT FOR THE DEATH OF THEIR SON.

POINT THREE:

THE COURT IS NOT BOUND BY THE PARTIES
STIPULATION THAT THE WRONGFUL DEATH ACT
PROVIDES A BASIS FOR RECOVERY AGAINST THE
DRAMSHOP DEFENDANTS.

This Court will not consider issues raised for the first

time on appeal.
The Defendants would, of course, have accepted a dismissal
of this case based upon the suggestion of Amicus.
made no issue of that point in the lower Court.

However, they
It was not until

this appeal that Defendants adopt the position of Amicus.
This Court has announced in a number of cases that it will
not entertain an issue raised for the first time, post judgment
or on appeal.

LeBaron

& Associates

v.

NEC Information

823 P.2d 479 (Utah 1991) cited therein are Turtle
Inc.

v.

Hagas Management,

James v. Preston

Inc.

Systems

Management,

645 P.2d 667 (Utah 1982); and

746 P.2d 799 (Utah Ap. 1987).

In the LeBaron

case, it is stated:
... It would make little sense to allow a party to
proceed at trial without submitting a legal theory to the
court, and then allow that party to raise the issue
9

following trial and require the court to re-open trial to
consider the issue... (LeBaron & Associates
Supra)
B.

The Defendants Stipulated that the Wrongful death statutes

of the State of Utah fully applied in this action.
On the 5th day of April, 1996, at a hearing of motions
pending before the lower Court, Defendants stipulated that the
wrongful death statute for the death of a child applied without
exception, to Plaintiffs cause of action.

This Stipulation was

embodied in a Court Order dated April 22, 1996.

A copy of the

Court Order (R. 1025-26) is attached as Addendum "A", to this
brief.

The case was tried to the jury, based in part upon that

Court Order.

When a party stipulates to a matter of fact of law

before trial, and then attempts to repudiate that stipulation
following trial, this is entirely inappropriate and beyond the
scope of any procedural rule.
C.

The wrongful death statutes apply to the Utah Dramshop Act.
The Utah Legislature has stated its intent regarding causes

under the Dramshop Act in the broadest terms.

The liquor

provider is liable for:
Injuries in person, property, or means of support to
any third person, or to the spouse, child, or parent of that
third person, resulting from the intoxication. (Title 32A14-101(1))
Then to emphasize that intent, it added Section (3) to the
Statute which reads:
A person who suffers an injury under Subsection 1 has a
cause of action against the person who provided the
alcoholic beverage in violation of Subsection 1.

10

When the Legislature provided a cause of action to a spouse,
child or parent of the third person, it obviously contemplated a
wrongful death action.
When the Legislature amended the Dramshop Liability Act in
1997, it made the above interpretation clear in its intent
language.
The express inclusion of wrongful death to Section
[32A-14-101] does not create a new right but merely
clarifies that a person has the right to recover both
special and general damages for wrongful death under the
Dramshop Act. (Senate Journal, Friday, January 31, 1997 and
House Journal, Wednesday, February 19, 1997)
If further support were needed, the Court is invited to
consider the case of Beaupre
415 (Rhode Island 1986).

v. Boulevard

Billiard

Club 510 A.2d

In that case the lower Court held that

the Dramshop Act of Rhode Island did not allow a wrongful death
action.

On appeal, the Court reversed, stating as follows:

Section 3-11-1 represents the current trend in our
society to deal with the serious problem of alcohol-related
injury by holding those individuals who dispense
intoxicating beverages in violation of liquor laws
responsible for the consequences of their actions. It is
the manifest intent of the Legislature that this statute be
construed liberally to further the Legislature's declared
purpose of promoting the reasonable control of the traffic
in alcoholic beverages G.L. 1956 (1976 Reenactment) § 3-15. To implement this legislative intent, the statute was
couched in the broadest of terms, allowing recovery for "any
injury" caused by the wrongful action of an intoxicated
person. The pain and suffering associated with a fatal
injury as well as the wrongful death of an individual are
certainly within the context of the phrase "any injury to
the person". The plain language of the statute, when
coupled with the clear legislative intent, compels a finding
that the wrongful death of an individual constitutes a
compensable injury under § 3-11-1.

11

POINT FOUR:

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN RULING THAT

PUNITIVE DAMAGES COULD BE AWARDED IN THIS CASE.
Under this point, Defendants state that the Dramshop Act
does not provide for punitive damages, therefore, punitive
damages cannot be awarded.
Whether punitive damages can be awarded against Dramshop
Defendants is a matter of first impression.
inferentially addressed in the case of Biswell
39 (Utah 1987).

This issue is
v. Duncan 742 P.2d

The appeals court held:

After careful examination of the authorities on this
question, we hold that punitive damages are recoverable
against a drunken driver in an automobile personal injury
case where it can be established (1) that the Defendant
motorist acted with actual malice or a reckless disregard of
the rights and safety of others, and (2) that his drunken
driving was a contributing cause of the accident. We
believe that one who drives a car after voluntarily drinking
to excess, with its great potential for causing serious
injury, could be found, under proper circumstances, to
demonstrate a "reckless indifference to the rights of
others" sufficient to allow the issue of punitive damages to
be considered by the trier of fact...
*****************

... Cognizant of the grave problems drunk driving poses, the
Utah Legislature has enacted one of the strongest impaired
driving laws in the country. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-6-44
-41-6-44.20 (1987). In addition, the 1981 Legislature
passed the "Dramshop Act" which imposes liability for those
who provide intoxicating liquors which result in injuries to
third persons. Utah Code Ann. § 32A-14-1 (1986). These
statutes represent a legislative determination that public
safety is gravely endangered when a person operates a motor
vehicle after consuming alcoholic beverages...
Following Biswell,

the Legislature adopted 17-18-1 UCA 1953

relating to punitive damages.

The statute in part reads:

(1) (a) Except as otherwise provided by statute, punitive
damages may be awarded only if compensatory or general
damages are awarded and it is established by clear and
convincing evidence that the acts or omissions of the

12

tortfeasor are the result of willful and malicious or
intentionally fraudulent conduct, or conduct that manifests
a knowing and reckless indifference toward and a disregard
of, the rights of others.
(b) The limitations, standards of evidence, and
standards of conduct of Subsection (1)(a) do not apply to
any claim for punitive damages arising out of the
torfeasor's operation of a motor vehicle while voluntarily
intoxicated or under the influence of any drug or
combination of alcohol and drugs as prohibited by Section
41-66-44...
The standards and limitations in the act do not apply to
intoxicated drivers and that by necessary implication, should not
apply to those who furnish the alcohol.1

As stated in

Biswell,

punitive damages may be awarded against intoxicated drivers.

It

must logically follow that punitive damages may be awarded
against those who supply the alcohol.

There is no provision of

the Dramshop Act which states or implies that punitive damages
may not be awarded.

This case gives the Court an opportunity to

extend the reasoning of Biswell

and to clearly state that

punitive damages may be awarded against alcohol providers under
the same standards as applied to intoxicated drivers.
Here the two clubs gave the driver Bredehoft enough alcohol
to bring his BAC to 0.27 at the time of the accident.
three and one half times the statutory limit.

This is

Clearly that type

of conduct must be punished and punitive damages appears to be
the only way to impose responsibility.

The Lower Court, in it's instructions submitted the issue to the jury on a clear and convincing standard.
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POINT FIVE:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT

TO THE INDIVIDUAL MICKELSON DEFENDANTS AND CLUB MANAGEMENT, INC.
Before trial, the lower Court granted summary judgment to
the individual Mickelson Defendants and Club Management, Inc.
In support of the summary judgment granted by the lower
Court, Defendants base their claim of immunity upon the fact that
they complied with the law in that the two private clubs, Uncle
Bart's Club and Charley's Club were properly formed non-profit
corporations and that Club Management, Inc. the profit
corporation was properly formed and existing at the time of the
events giving rise to the action and did not sell liquor to Paul
G. Bredehoft.
The Mickelson Family had such a community of interest in
ownership with the three corporations that the separate
personalities of the corporation and the individuals no longer
existed; and that to sanction a corporate shield in this case
would promote an injustice.

Furthermore, the various elements

relating to this subject disclosed by the facts developed prior
to trial, show that there is a genuine issue of material fact
that should have been determined by a jury.
The facts taken from the financial documents and depositions
of the individuals show the following:
1.

Uncle Bart's Club and Charley's Club were acquired by

Mickelsons for approximately $31,000.00 in about 1989 or 1990.
The personal property represented by that purchase became the
property of Club Management, Inc.

This property is leased to

Uncle Bart's Club and Charley's Club under the terms of a
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Management Agreement between Club Management, Inc. and two other
clubs.
2.

Neither of the private clubs have any assets.
All of the officers, trustees, and directors of the

Club Management, Inc., and the two clubs are all members of the
Mickelson Family.
3.

There are no outsiders.

It is not possible from reference to the stock

certificates attached to Defendant's Memorandum to determine who
the stock holders are in Club Management, Inc., except James D.
Mickelson and Jeannie B. Mickelson.

There is some indication

that Douglas J. Mickelson and Marlene M. Mickelson were
stockholders but there is no certificate to so indicate.

Jeannie

B. Mickelson, in her deposition, did not know whether she was a
stockholder of Club Management, Inc.

(Deposition of Jeannie B.

Mickelson, Page 13)
4.

Uncle Bart's Club and Charley's Club are in form, non

profit corporations owned by its members.

However, each of the

those clubs have entered into an identical management contract
with Club Management, Inc. (Ex 21)

Under the terms of the

contract, the clubs purchase the liquor and other consumables.
All of the personnel utilized by the clubs are provided by Club
Management, Inc.

Additionally, Club Management, Inc. provides

management services.
5.

Under the Management Contract, Club Management, Inc.,

is entitled to receive for its services, $35.00 per hour not to
exceed One Hundred Five (105) hours per week.

Potentially, Club

Management, Inc., could earn from each club, the sum of one
hundred ninety one thousand, one hundred dollars ($191,100.00)
15

per year.

Neither of the clubs show a profit of any consequence.

The money is siphoned off each club for the benefit of the
Mickelson Family.
6.

None of the "members11 of Uncle Bart's Club or Charley's

Club participate either in the management of the club or its
gross profit.

There is no evidence that any profits or other

benefits are ever returned to the members.
7.

There is no evidence that either of the clubs held

Trustees meetings.
8.

There is no evidence that Club Management, Inc., held

regular directors meetings.
9.

At most, once per year, the family met and signed

corporate papers prepared by James Mickelson, who is an attorney.
(Deposition of Marlene M. Mickelson, Page 18)
10.

All money generated by the club is handled and

controlled exclusively by the Mickelson Family.
A.

Compliance with some corporate formalities is not sufficient

to provide insulation for personal liability.
The rule adopted by the Utah Court regarding the Alter Ego
Doctrine was distinctly stated in the case of Colman v.

Colman

743 P.2d 782 (Utah).
To disregard the corporate entity under the equitable
alter ego doctrine, two circumstances must be shown: (1)
Such a unity of interest and ownership that the separate
personalities of the corporation and the individual no
longer exist, but the corporation is, instead, the alter ego
of one or a few individuals; and (2) if observed, the
corporate form would sanction a fraud, promote injustice, or
result in an inequity, (citing cases) It is not necessary
that the plaintiff prove actual fraud, but must only show
that failure to pierce the corporate veil would result in an
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injustice.

Healthwin-Midtown

Convalescent

Hosp.,

511 F.

Supp. at 420.
Certain factors which are deemed significant, although not
conclusive, in determining whether this test has been met
include: (1) undercapitalization of a one-man corporation;
(2) failure to observe corporate formalities (3) nonpayment
of dividends; (4) siphoning of corporate funds by the
dominant stockholder; (5) non functioning of other officers
or directors; (6) absence of corporate records; (7) the use
of the corporation as a facade for operations of the
dominant stockholder or stockholders; and (8) the use of the
corporate entity in promoting injustice or fraud. (citing
cases)
Although corporate documents were prepared and filed with
the State of Utah and the UTAH ALCOHOL BEVERAGE COMMISSION, they
were mere formalities.

Charley's Club and Uncle Bart's Club are

non profit corporations.
corporation.

Club Management, Inc., is a for profit

Club Management has a management agreement with

Uncle Bart's Club and Charley's Club.

The Agreements are

identical. The basic structure of the agreement is that Club
Management, Inc., will lease to the non-profit corporations,
employees and equipment and provide management.

(Ex 21)

A significant provision of the agreement is that Club
Management, Inc., will provide not less than three senior
officers as managers.

In fact, only one member of the Mickelson

Family was involved in the management duties at Uncle Bart's Club
and one member at Charley's Club; Jeannie B. Mickelson at
Charley's Club and Marlene M. Mickelson at Uncle Bart's Club.
The evidence shows that for the most part, their duties consisted
of employing personnel, purchasing liquor and supplies, and
monitoring liquor inventory as matched to cash register tapes to
control any leakage of either liquor or money from the club.
There was no management at either club on March 1, 1994, at the
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time that Paul G. Bredehoft was drinking at Uncle Bart's Club and
Charley's Club.

In fact, Jeannie B. Mickelson testified that she

was the manager of Charley's Club and she usually left the club
by 2:30 in the afternoon (Deposition of Jeannie B. Mickelson,
Page 49).

There was no oversight or instruction given to

bartenders.

Marlene M. Mickelson was manager of Uncle Bart's

Club and performed the same work for Uncle Bart's that Jeannie B.
Mickelson did for Charley's Club.

She usually left the club

between 6:30 and 7:30 p.m. leaving the club in charge of the
bartender (Deposition of Marlene M. Mickelson, Page 43).

When

she hired bartenders she did not tell them how much liquor they
could give any one person in a given period of time (Deposition
of Marlene M. Mickelson, Page 41).
There apparently was very little management related to
compliance with the law and regulations of the UABC.

As an

example, the membership lists of both club (Ex 30 and 31) show
that Paul G. Bredehoft was not a member of either club in 1994,
the year of the accident.

The law is clear on this subject.

§

32A-5-107(7) provides:
A private club may not sell alcoholic beverages to any
person other than a member, guest, or visitor who holds a
valid visitor card issued under Subsection (6).
The case of DeFusion Co. v.

Utah Liquor

Control

Com'n 613

P.2d 1120 (Utah 1980) held:
A person who is not a member or who does not hold a valid
guest card is an "interdicted person" with respect to
alcoholic drinks in the club. Thus, the sale of liquor to
such a person, as well as the purchase from the liquor store
by such person, is proscribed by the statutes.
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All of the Mickelson Family know Paul G. Bredehoft.

Douglas

Mickelson knew that he had had at least one prior DUI. James
Mickelson represented Paul G. Bredehoft in a DUI in Tooele County
and knew that he had had prior DUI's (Deposition of James
Mickelson, Pg. 71). James Mickelson was on the premises of Uncle
Bart's briefly the night of the accident.

He spoke to Paul G.

Bredehoft and saw that he had a drink in front of him (Deposition
of James Mickelson, Pg. 75). The Mickelson Family committed a
crime by allowing Paul Bredehoft to drink liquor at the two
clubs.

Another important factor is the way the money generated by
the clubs was handled.

No one, other than the Mickelson Family,

had access to the money.
There is testimony in the depositions that the only money
received by the Mickelson Family was a management fee of
approximately $1500.00 per month to Marlene M. Mickelson and
Jeannie B. Mickelson.
D. Mickelson.

There were some legal fees paid to James

However, examination of the tax returns for 1993,

attached to Defendants Memorandum, points in a different
direction.

The gross income of both clubs for 1993 is

$770,651.00.
expense.

Of that amount, $184,545.99 was charged to employee

Then there is a combined charge for both clubs for

advertising and promotion of $113,565.85.

We know that only the

Mickelson Family had access to the checks and cash of the two
clubs.

If the advertising and promotion accounts for 1993 were
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spent for that purpose then it is a violation of statute.

Title

32A-5-107(23) UCA provides:
A private club may not engage in any public
solicitation or public advertising calculated to increase
its membership.
If the account was a true advertising and promotion account,
it violated statute.

If it were used for other purposes, there

was a diversion of funds from what would otherwise be the capital
of both clubs.
It is obvious that the Mickelson Family makes its living
from these two private clubs.

Title 32A-5-107(22) provides:

A private club may not pay any person or entity any
fee, salary, rent, or other payment of any kind in excess of
the fair market value for the service rendered, goods
furnished, or facilities or equipment rented. It is the
intention of this subsection to insure that no officer,
managing agent, employee, or other person derives economic
benefit from the operation of the club.
The Mickelson Family clearly benefits economically from the
two private clubs in violation of the statute.

There is abundant

evidence at this point that the two private clubs and Club
Management, Inc., share a complete unity of interest with the
Mickelson Family.

They comprise all of the officers, directors,

and trustees of the entities.

They handle all of the money.

The

clubs and management company operate for the sole benefit of the
Mickelson Family.

No dividends are paid, no club members other

than the family participate in management and no benefits are
ever returned to the members.

The purposes of the two clubs are

not educational, charitable, or recreational as they claim to be
(See Articles of Incorporation of Charley's Club, Inc. a Non
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Profit Corporation as R. 1844, Ex 35).

The sole reason for the

existence of the clubs is to sell alcoholic beverages for the
profit of the Mickelson Family.

It is also clear that they do

not adequately manage the clubs or provide the senior officers
for management.
B.

To Allow Corporate Immunity in this Case Would be To

Sanction a Fraud. Promote Injustice, or Result in an Inequity.
This point relates to the second circumstance set forth in
the Colman case (Supra.) and followed in the case of
Corp.

v. Callahan

Envirotech

872 P.2d 487 (Utah 1994).

As noted earlier, Paul G. Bredehoft would have had to have a
total of 18 to 22 drinks.

Paul G. Bredehoft consumed the alcohol

producing his intoxication at the two clubs operated by the
Mickelson Family and managed by Club Management, Inc.
Patti Middaugh, one of the bartenders at Uncle Bart's Club,
testified in her deposition that when Paul G. Bredehoft left the
premises on March 1, 1994, at approximately 6:30 he had consumed
seven drinks (Deposition of Patti Middaugh, Page 30). This was
sufficient to put his BAC over the statutory presumption of 0.08.
In addition, that number of drinks violated the standard
promulgated by "T.I.P.S." which all bartenders must adhere.
is usually one drink per hour.

This

Jackie Lackey, the bartender who

preceded Patti Middaugh, testified that she served Paul Bredehoft
seven (7) drinks (Tr. 443).
Paul G. Bredehoft was an interdicted person by definition
and hence it was a crime for either club to serve him liquor.
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It is important to note also, that Title 32A-12-103 provides
that parties in charge are vicariously criminally liable as
principals with those who are guilty of the offense.
When the entire State Alcohol Beverage Control Act is
surveyed, if it is apparent that it is, as stated, an exercise of
the police power for the protection of the citizens of this State
and fastens regulatory control and criminal liability on all
those who participate in the sale of alcoholic beverages in
violation of law.

Reeves

v. Gentile

813 P.2d 111 (Utah 1991)

The individual Defendants and Club Management, Inc. assert
that they did not sell Paul Bredehoft liquor and therefore cannot
be guilty of a violation of the DABC.

Plaintiffs stress to the

Court that providing Paul Bredehoft with a sufficient amount of
liquor to create a 0.27 BAC was criminal.

Plaintiffs stress to

the Court that the principals in these two clubs are vicariously
liable for the criminal violation pursuant to Title 32A-12-103
UCA 1953.

The violation of Title 32A-5-107(24)(h) is a crime.

The individual Defendants and Club Management, Inc. are liable
for that crime.

As here, the violation gives rise to a civil

cause of action.

The lower Court erred in granting summary

judgment to the individual Defendants and Club Management, Inc.
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POINT SIX:

PUNITIVE DAMAGES ARE SEPARATE AND APART FROM

DAMAGES CONTEMPLATED BY THE DAMAGE CAP IN THE DRAMSHOP ACT.
Under this point, Defendants state that the terms of the
damage cap section of the Dramshop Act, limit the amount to one
hundred thousand dollars ($100,000,00) regardless of whether it
is determined to be general or punitive damages.
Except for Article XVI, § 5 (Wrongful Death), Defendants
have not argued the constitutionality of the damage cap.

If this

Court determines, as surely it must, that the Damage Cap is
unconstitutional, then the argument of Defendants under this
point is moot.

If however, the Court should determine that the

Dramshop Cap is constitutional, then the Court must further
determine whether the Damage Cap embraces both compensatory and
punitive damages.

Defendants do not cite any authority or case

law for their conclusion.

The answer to the question is

contained in the statute, but not the conclusion Defendants are
striving for.
In Utah Code Ann. § 32A-14-101(5), it is stated:
The total amount of damages that may be awarded to any
person pursuant to a cause of action under this chapter ...
(emphasis added)
Subsection (3) of the statute reads:
A person who suffers an injury under Subsection (1) has a
cause of action against the person who provided the
alcoholic beverage in violation of Subsection (1)
The statute obviously refers to a cause of action for
injury.

This in turn means general and special compensatory

damage, but not punitive damages.
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It is well to remember that punitive damages, although based
upon an underlying cause of action for injury, serve a far
different function than compensatory damage.

Punitive damages

are awarded as punishment and deterrence, where conduct, as in
this case, is outrageous.

Johnson v. Rogers

1988) .
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763 P.2d 771 (Utah

POINT SEVEN:

THE LOWER COURT DAMAGE AWARD TO EACH PARENT IN THE

AMOUNT OF ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND DOLLARS ($100,000.00) AGAINST EACH
DEFENDANT IS CORRECT.
Assuming, arguendo, that the decision of the Court holding
that the Dramshop Damage Cap is not unconstitutional2, then the
interpretation of the Court as to the award of General Damages,
namely one hundred thousand ($100,000.00) to each Plaintiff
against each Dramshop Defendant, is correct.

Reference to the

statute will make the Courts reasoning clear:
(1) Any person who directly gives, sells, or otherwise
provides liquor, or at a location allowing consumption on
the premises, any alcoholic beverage, to the following
person, and by those actions causes the intoxication of
that person, is liable for injuries in person, property, or
means of support to any third person, or to the spouse,
child, or parent of that third person, resulting from the
intoxication. . . (emphasis added)
It will be noted that the statute uses the term "parent" in
its singular individual form, and not in the joint form
"parents".

The Legislature intended, by that language, to make

the Dramshop operator liable to the parents of a deceased child
separately and not jointly as a unit.

Both parents have a

separate cause of action for their injuries and damage.
The Statute continues:
(3) A person who suffers an injury under Subsection (1) has
a cause of action against the person who provided the
alcoholic beverage in violation of Subsection(1). (emphasis
added)

Plaintiffs position throughout this case is that the Damage Cap is unconstitutional and defends the decision of the
Court in the alternative.

25

The Act does not provide a cause of action for a group, such
as "children" and "parents".

It provides a cause of action for

each "person" who suffers an injury.
The Statute goes on to state:
(5) The total amount of damages that my be awarded to
any person pursuant to a cause of action under this chapter
that arises after July 1, 1985, is limited to $100,000.00
and the aggregate amount which may be awarded to all persons
injured as a result of one occurrence is limited to
$300,000.00. (emphasis added)
Here again, the Statute speaks of damages awarded to a
person and not a group.
Case Law supports the reasoning of the Court.
case of Switzer

v. Reynolds

In the Utah

606 P.2d 44 (Utah 1980), the

decedent, Switzer, was killed in an accident on June 24, 1963.
He left surviving, a wife and five (5) minor children.

Not until

1974, did the surviving wife, as guardian for the children, file
an action on their behalf for the death of their father.

The

lower Court dismissed the case on the evident ground that the
statute of limitations had run.

The Supreme Court held that the

statute was tolled during the minority of the children, ruling
that even though the limitations statute might bar recovery for
one heir, it could be tolled for other heirs.

The Court stated:

The wrongful death action of § 78-11-7 is not a joint
cause of action. Therefore, a defense which would bar
recovery by one of the heirs will not preclude all other
heirs. Thus, individual circumstances may toll the statute
of limitations of § 78-12-28(2) as to one of the heirs. The
concept that the wrongful death action is a joint cause of
action has been rejected in recent decisions, which will be
discussed infra.
The reasoning applied in Switzer,

in the case of death to an

adult leaving heirs, applies equally to the wrongful death action
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of a child set forth in § 78-11-6 UCA 1953.
Behm's Estate,

See also In Re

213 P.2d 657 (Utah 1950).

Cases from another jurisdiction relate specifically to the
Dramshop Act of that state and the damage cap in the statute.
the case of Childers

v. Modglin,

In

119 N.E.2d 519 (111. 1954)

action was brought under the Dramshop Act by the surviving wife
and ten (10) children of Childers.

The theory of the Complaint

was that the Plaintiffs were entitled to the damage cap of
$15,000 for each of the eleven Plaintiffs.

Defendant argued that

the maximum that could be recovered was the damage cap of $15,000
in the aggregate.

The Court held:

By applying the limit in this case to each cause of
action separately, all parts of the statute are consistent,
the application is definite and certain, it applies equally
to all persons, and makes the statute practical and
workable.
To apply the limit to a group of persons
produces inconsistency within the statute itself, leads to
consequences at times absurd, results in a variety of
inequalities, and is wholly impractical in its operation
without extensive tinkering; in fact, it would require the
courts to fill in a number of voids which would normally be
regulated by statute, if any such system had been
contemplated.
Under these conditions we reject the objectionable
alternative, and hold that the limit of recovery applies to
each separate right of action as it previously existed. Any
plaintiff who is injured within the terms of the statute has
the right to recover up to, but not exceeding, $15,000.00,
regardless of the existence of other claims, established or
establishable, and regardless of the number of defendants
sued or suable.
The decision of the Childers' case was followed in the
later Illinois case of Hudson v. Leverenz,

132 N.E.2d 427 (111.)3

Following the two cases cited, the Illinois Legislature amended the Dramshop Act and it was held in Moran v.
Katsinas, 157 N.E.2d 38 (111. 1959) that the cap applied regardless of the number of injured parties. The Court did
not however, overrule the two cases cited above.
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To underscore the reasoning of the lower Court, we suggest
two hypotheticals.

Assume a situation where a child is killed

under circumstances giving rise to a Dramshop Action.
further that the parents are divorced.

Assume

The Court could not

compel them to make common cause against the Dramshop Act.

They

would each have a cause of action and the damages awarded would
be commensurate with the individual loss. Also, assume a further
situation where the Dramshop Defendant has a defense to one of
the parents.

Obviously this would not bar a suit brought by the

other parent.
The Utah Dramshop Act is couched in terms of individual
causes of action for those injured by a liquor provider.

It

contains no term or language indicating that those who suffer
injury, such as parents or children, must join and aggregate
their individual claims below the Dramshop Cap.
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POINT EIGHT:

THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING DEFENDANTS

MOTIONS FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT AND NEW TRIAL
WITH RESPECT TO PUNITIVE DAMAGE JUDGMENT AGAINST DEFENDANTS.
Under this point, Defendant, Charley's Club must marshal the
evidence in support of the jury's award of punitive damages.

The

statement is incomplete and does not correctly portray the
negative evidence.
The Court is referred to the Statement of Facts contained in
Plaintiffs' initial brief where these matters are highlighted.
To emphasize this point, we note that Defendants have failed to
discuss the fact that there was no senior management present at
either club on the fatal night.

Jim Mickelson was on the

premises of Uncle Bart's, not Charley's Club as indicated on Page
45 of Charley's Club brief.

He spoke to Paul Bredehoft and

noticed that he was drinking.

Bredehoft was not a member of

either club and it was a violation of the regulations and
criminal statutes to serve him liquor.

Yet, he consumed from 18

to 22 ounces of liquor at Uncle Bart's and Charley's Club.

Patti

Middaugh, a bartender at Uncle Bart's said that when Paul
Bredehoft left that club, he had consumed a sufficient number of
drinks to make him legally intoxicated.

(Tr. 153)

Gloria Anderson, bartender at Charley's Club, would only
admit that she served Paul Bredehoft one drink.

If the

bartenders are to be believed (obviously the jury did not believe
them) then Paul Bredehoft only had seven or eight drinks that
night and all the alcohol was imbibed at the two clubs (except
the one half beer at the Clubhouse, which is not here involved).
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(There is no indication that Bredehoft drank at establishments
other than Uncle Bart's and Charley's as it implied on Page 45 of
Charley's Club brief).

Paul G. Bredehoft drank at only two

establishments and those were Charley's Club and Uncle Bart's
Club, owned and operated by the Mickelson Family.
Steven Moreland was a former bartender employed at both
clubs in 1993.

He knew Paul G. Bredehoft and testified that

Bredehoft was a frequent patron at Uncle Bart's and was always
intoxicated when he left the bar. (Tr. 228)
Steve Moreland attended employee meetings during the term of
his employment.

The underlying theme at these meetings was how

to sell more drinks.

Mr. Moreland was encouraged to sell more

alcohol to patrons. (Tr. 225)
Steve Moreland was never given any instructions as to how
much liquor he could sell to a patron or when to stop serving a
patron.

(Tr. 224)

He observed Bredehoft and Douglas Mickelson

drinking together at Uncle Bart's. (Tr. 223)
Defendants fail to recognize or state that there was no
management at either club on the evening and night of the fatal
accident; with one exception:

James Mickelson stopped by Uncle

Bart's for a few minutes, observed Paul Bredehoft and engaged him
in conversation.

Paul Bredehoft was not a member and should not

have been served liquor.
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POINT NINE:

DEFENDANTS DID NOT SEEK A NEW TRIAL ON "ALL

ISSUES" IN THE LOWER COURT.
For the first time in this case, the Defendants ask this
Court for a new trial on all issues under the guise of a Motion
for New Trial on the issue of Punitive Damage.

The matters under

this point now briefed and argued before this Court by Defendants
were not presented to the Court below on Motion for New Trial.
(R. 1693-1708)
Now Defendants ask for a new trial based upon the failure of
the Court to apportion damages among Defendants, error in
instructions, and error in awarding a joint and several judgment
against Defendants.
Defendants argue that this Court should re-examine and over
rule, the case of Reeves

v. Gentile,

813 P.2d 111 (Utah 1991) and

hold that the negligence of all Defendants must be compared.
Defendants overlook the fact that the Dramshop Act contains the
following:
(7) Nothing in this chapter precludes any cause of action
or additional recovery against the person causing the
injury.
The Legislature has, by that section, clearly separated the
person causing the injury from the liquor supplier and thereby
makes apportionment impossible.
Although not stated in Defendants brief, what they seek is
to compare their culpability with that of Paul Bredehoft, thereby
reducing their exposure to *the million dollar verdict.
The actions of Paul Bredehoft on the fatal night were
criminal.

He was convicted of automobile homicide and that

31

conviction was recently affirmed on appeal by the Court of
Appeals.

State

v. Bredehoft,

353 Utah Adv. Rep 3 (CA, 10/01/98)

In a case such as this, where the liquor providers are under
a positive statutory duty to prevent the very conduct on the part
of Bredehoft that caused the death of Sean Adkins, how can the
Defendants come before this Court and say they should be given
the advantage of the conduct of Bredehoft?

We do not believe

that the Legislature intended such a result in the adoption of
the comparative negligence statutes.
P.2d 539 (Utah Ct. App. 1997); Field
10 (Utah 1998) and Cortez

v. University

F.Supp 1096 (D. Utah 1996).

See State

v. McBride,

v. Boyer Co. Utah Adv. Rep.
Mall Shopping

Center

Services

941

Furthermore, neither Defendant filed

a cross claim against the other or against Paul Bredehoft.
the case of National

940

v. B. W. Norton Manufacturing,

In
937

P.2d 551 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), the Appeals Court stated:
In reaching our conclusion, we recognize that prohibiting
subsequent apportionment suits essentially requires joint
torfeasor codefendants to raise cross-claims against each
other in the underlying tort action or else such claims may
be lost. As such, cross-claims for apportionment among
joint torfeasor codefendants are mandatory.
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POINT TEN:

DEFENDANTS DID NOT REQUEST A NEW TRIAL OF THE

LOWER COURT BASED UPON INSTRUCTION NO. 33.
Defendants' Motion for New Trial in the lower Court was
based on the issue of punitive damages.

They now seek a new

trial in this Court on all issues based upon the claim that
wrongful death damages are not included in the Dramshop Act.
This is not the approach they took in the lower Court.

In the

lower Court, they sought a new trial only on the issue of
punitive damages (R. 1754)
They overlook (1) the fact that they stipulated in open
court that the Wrongful Death Act did apply to the Dramshop Act;
(2) that the Legislature in it's "Intent Language" states that
the Wrongful Death Acts applies; and (3) that in fact, the only
rational interpretation of the Dramshop Act is that it does
include actions and damages for wrongful death.
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POINT ELEVEN:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO AWARD INTEREST

FROM THE DAY OF THE SPECIAL VERDICT.
This point has been adequately briefed by Plaintiffs in
their brief.

POINT TWELVE:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING A STAY OF

EXECUTION IN THIS MATTER.
This point has been adequately briefed by Plaintiffs in
their brief.
CONCLUSION
1.

Defendants assert that the Wrongful Death Statutes of

the State of Utah do not apply to the Utah Dramshop Act.

The

argument is vilacious because:
a.

Defendants stipulated before trial that the Wrongful

Death Act did apply and the lower Court so ordered.
b.

The Utah State Legislature in it's recent amendment to

the Dramshop Act in its "Intent Language" said the Wrongful
Death Statutes apply.
c.

Analysis of the language of the Dramshop Act shows that

the Wrongful Death Acts apply.
2.

Defendants ignore one of the major issues in this case;

the constitutionality of the Damage Cap in the Dramshop Act.
(Except Article XVI, §5 (Wrongful Death)).

The constitutional

provisions briefed and argued in the lower Court by Plaintiffs
mainly Article I, §7 (Due Process of Law); Article I, §10 (Trial
34

by Jury); Article I, §11 (Open Courts); Article I,
Operation of Law).

§24 (Uniform

In addition to Article XVI, §5 (Wrongful

Death - Damages), all point on erringly.

Point Two, the

conclusion that the Damage cap is unconstitutional.
3.

The Court erred in granting Summary Judgment to the

individual Defendants and Club Management, Inc.
4.

The lower Court was in the advantaged position of

hearing all the evidence and observing the demeanor and
credibility of all the witnesses.

It determined that punitive

damages were properly submitted to the jury and the amount of
damage awarded by the jury is well within the guidelines set
forth in Crookston

v. Farmers Insurance

Exchange 817 P.2d 789

(Utah 1991)
The cross-appeal of Defendants should be denied and the
relief requested by Plaintiffs in their appeal should be granted,
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / /

day of October, 1998.

GARRETT & GARRETT

\

Edward M. /Garrett
Attorney for
Plaintiffs/Appellants
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ADDENDUM

DOCUMENT

"A"

Order of April 22, 1996 (Addendum No. 7 in
Appellants' Brief)
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ADDENDUM "A

FILE! Bi£7&£7 COURT
Third Judicial District

APR 2 2 1S86
Edward M. Garrett #1163
James D. Garrett #6091
GARRETT & GARRETT
2091 East 1300 South #201
Salt Lake City, UT 84108
Telephone: (801) 581-1144

»y.

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN
AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MICHAEL L. ADKINS and ROBERTA B.
ADKINS,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

}
;)

ORDER

;
]

)
UNCLE BART'S INC., dba UNCLE BART'S
;
CLUB, CHARLEY'S CLUB, INC., dba
;)
CHARLEY'S CLUB, ANN SISTTIE, dba, THE ;
CLUBHOUSE, CLUB MANAGEMENT, Inc., ;

Civil No. 940907146 PI
Judge Timothy R. Hanson

Defendants.
On the 5th day of April, 1996, at a hearing on various motions pending in this case, the
Defendants and each of them in open court and on the record stipulated that the elements of
damage for a cause of action, for the wrongful death of a child, as established by the Wrongful
Death Statute 78-11 (78-11-6) and the interpreted case law of the Appellate Courts of the State
of Utah apply without exception to this cause of action claiming a violation of the DramShop
Liability Act 32A-14-101 U.C.A. (1953).

IrOJS

The Court having considered the stipulation of the Defendants now orders:
1.

That the Stipulation of Defendants as set forth above is the "law of the case" in

this action and that the elements of a cause of action for the death of a child, as set forth in
Title 78-11-6 U.C.A. (1953) and the interpretive decisions of the Appellate Cburts of this
State apply without exeption to the cause of action pending in this CoxjFfoased upon Title 32A14-101 U.C.A. 1953 (DramShop Liability Act).
Dated this fr^day of April, 1996.
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